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ABSTRACT
A contested basis of international competence in the enforcement of foreign judgments is mere presence. Comparative study reveals that the courts are divided, academics have generally been critical of it and, except in the US, legislators have shied away from using it. The paper assesses the propriety of mere presence as a basis of international competence against the background of a recent South African decision in which the court affirmed this basis of international competence.
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A. INTRODUCTION
Business people on the move between states face the risk of becoming amenable to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, the exercise of which may potentially result in a judgment debt being given against them. The common law insists that mere presence in a state is a basis on which its courts can assume jurisdiction over a foreign domiciled defendant.​[1]​ At the same time, there are old authorities that support mere presence as a basis of international competence in actions to enforce foreign judgments.​[2]​ Some of these authorities have been assessed as explainable on other grounds, or constrained by their context.​[3]​ Obiter dicta aside, there is no recent direct authority in the common law world in favour of mere presence as founding international competence.​[4]​ In fact, there are cases that deny mere presence as a basis of international competence. The Supreme Court of the Straits Settlement objected to presence as a basis of international competence.​[5]​ In the Canadian Supreme Court case of Beals v Saldanha,​[6]​ Justice LeBel in his dissent rejected the continued recognition of presence as a basis of international competence suggesting that it is arbitrary and formalistic rather than fair and reasonable. It is also noteworthy that several statutory alternatives to common law enforcement that provide for the registration of foreign judgments refer to residence (rather than presence) as a basis on which a foreign court will be taken to have had jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing its judgment.​[7]​ The absence of any mention of presence in these enactments of the common law is telling.​[8]​

Generally, writers have been critical of mere presence as founding international competence. The learned authors of Cheshire and North’s Private International Law suggest that it is debatable whether the defendant’s presence in the foreign country for a short time will suffice for international competence in an action to enforce a foreign judgment.​[9]​ To them “casual presence, as distinct from residence, is not a desirable basis of jurisdiction.”​[10]​ In Australia, Nygh and Davis assert that there is little doubt that a foreign judgment founded on temporary presence will be recognised, but they find Cheshire and North’s critique of the rule just.​[11]​ In Canada, Castel and Walker suggest that although a foreign court may have jurisdiction founded on presence, in this day and age only ordinary residence seems to conform to the constitutional principles enunciated in Morguard v. De Savoye.​[12]​

The recent unanimous decision of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Richman v. Ben-Tovim​[13]​ needs to be evaluated against this background. South Africa’s primary legal system comprises a mixture of the Roman-Dutch law and English common law. South African cases are routinely cited and relied on in other Southern African countries.​[14]​ It is likely Richman will be followed in other Southern African countries. South Africans live in one of the most prosperous countries in Africa, and actively maintain international commercial relationships with the outside world. Furthermore, people regularly seek the enforcement of foreign money judgments there.​[15]​ Thus, for South African domiciliaries and foreigners transacting with people who own assets in South Africa this decision is important. Moreover, it is the most direct recent judicial pronouncement on the issue in the common law world, and may potentially serve as persuasive authority in other jurisdictions.

B. RICHMAN v BEN-TOVIM
This was an action seeking to enforce in South Africa a default judgment obtained in England against the defendant. The defendant had been served with the relevant claim form at his hotel in London during a temporary visit.​[16]​ The cause of action related to legal services rendered and disbursements incurred by the plaintiff on the defendant’s behalf. At no stage did the defendant challenge the jurisdiction of the English court or apply for the proceedings to be set aside or stayed. The defendant argued that, under South African law, his mere physical presence in England at the time of the institution of the action was insufficient to accord the English court international competence or jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The trial court upheld the defence, and dismissed the action. It reasoned that the defendant was neither domiciled nor resident in England at the time of the institution of the proceedings, and had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the English court. Consequently, the English court lacked the requisite international competence to entertain the matter. However, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a foreign court had jurisdiction to entertain an action sounding in money against any natural person who is merely physically present in that foreign state at the time of the institution of the action. 

C. EXAMINATION OF THE RICHMAN DECISION
1. Mere Presence as International Competence: Arguments For and Against
Before Richman, there had been considerable debate in the South African case-law and academic writings as to whether mere presence suffices as a basis of international competence in South African law.​[17]​ Both the trial court and the appellate court acknowledged the existence of this debate. Interestingly, the trial court felt itself bound to an earlier decision, Purser v Sales,​[18]​ in which a differently constituted Supreme Court of Appeal appeared to have endorsed the view that mere presence will not suffice for international competence 

There are positive and negative sides to international competence founded on mere presence.​[19]​ On the positive side it offers a simple solution to the uncertainty introduced into the law when courts attempt to decide what kinds or degrees of presence will suffice for international competence. The uncertainties in determining degrees of presence are reflected in the variation of terms used to describe presence. Words like “mere,” “transient,” “fleeting,” “temporary” “short” and “casual” are often used to describe presence, and, although apparently synonymous, have difficult quantitative and qualitative dimensions and entail uncertain discretionary assessments. Would one, two, three, or more days suffice? Would some few hours do? Is the motive behind the defendant’s presence in the jurisdiction relevant? Uncertainty adversely affects business and individual decision making. Increased transnational mobility on account of better means of transportation and more options exacerbate the difficulty posed by presence as a basis for international competence. In Richman, the court accepted counsel’s argument on the need to extend the traditional grounds of international competence to cater for “itinerant businessmen.”​[20]​ Jurisdiction founded on presence is certain; the court does not have to trouble itself to assess the extent and character of the presence.​[21]​

In Forbes,​[22]​ one of the arguments in support of international competence founded on mere presence was that it is consistent with international law, which grants each state territorial jurisdiction that attaches to all persons permanently or temporarily resident within the state. A defendant who is allowed to successfully argue against international competence founded on mere presence would have been allowed to curtail to a considerable degree the well-established doctrine of the supremacy of a state within its own territory. Well established though it may be, it still begs the question as to why another state should respect (enforce) a judgment founded on the exercise of this territorial jurisdiction. It is suggested that a refusal to enforce a foreign judgment does not amount to a curtailment of the supremacy doctrine but rather affirms the territorial nature thereof.

There are aspects of jurisdiction founded on mere presence that suggest that it would be unwise to affirm it as a basis of international competence. Unfortunately, the trial court and the Supreme Court of Appeal did not take advantage of the opportunity to investigate the multi-dimensional nature and unravel the complexity of these aspects. South African courts are noted for seeking comparative guidance from other foreign courts in making decisions.​[23]​ The Richman decision is of such significance and the issue debated to an extent that one would have expected the courts to consider comparative developments and case-law from other jurisdictions. Unfortunately, none of the cases cited by the courts was foreign. A comparative approach might have counselled them to proceed with caution. Indeed, superficial analysis is not limited to the judgments; critique of the rule in the leading texts on the subject also has often been limited to one-line statements failing to explain why such a rule is undesirable. The infrequency with which the issue arises may account for this cursory treatment.

It is difficult to reconcile mere presence as a basis of international competence with the theory of obligation which is sometimes seen as the foundation of the common law regime for the enforcement of foreign judgments.​[24]​ A legal obligation​[25]​ should be founded on actual circumstances. If a state imposed an obligation (debt and duty) on an individual and expected it to be honoured, it is fair and reasonable to expect that the defendant’s obligation to pay the judgment sum at wherever he has assets  be linked with the factual matrix that underlies the cause of action. A court should not fall prey to the illusion of sitting as an ‘international judicial tribunal’ open to the beck and call of litigants who are exempt from the need to establish a proper nexus between the litigants, the cause of action, and the state.​[26]​ Where jurisdiction is founded solely on mere presence, it is arguable whether it offers such connection as to merit an obligation due from the defendant to satisfy the judgment debt at wherever he has assets. It appears that the dispute was connected with England not only by the defendant’s presence,​[27]​  but also by the fact that the plaintiff’s consultancy firm was based in England. This firm rendered services to the defendant.  This aspect was not pursued in either one of the Richman judgments, however.

On the assumption that the obligation theory holds good in South African law on recognition and enforcement, the question as to whom the defendant’s obligation to satisfy the debt is owed remains to be answered: is it to the individual plaintiff, or to the state where he was present and the litigation took place, or to both? In the case of an obligation owed to the plaintiff, the existence of a cause of action, be it in contract, tort, or otherwise creates a relationship between the parties from which, undeniably, an obligation to make good any resulting damage arises. Where the defendant owes a civil obligation to the plaintiff, one would expect the forum in which the obligation is judicially sanctioned or imposed to have some connection with the factual matrix giving rise to the obligation. Mere presence within the forum hardly satisfies this requirement. Where a civic obligation exists towards the state, it is similarly hard to imagine that a transient presence there could give rise to an obligation in the form of a judgment debt and a duty to satisfy the judgment, long after the defendant might have left the jurisdiction.​[28]​ The foundation of this obligation is weaker where, as in Richman, the defendant failed to enter appearance or defend the action. By not appearing, the defendant in essence denies that any obligation is due. In Europe, it is noteworthy that even though the Brussels Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters [Brussels Regulation] can be characterised as very much pro-enforcement, a foreign judgment against a European Union domiciled defendant founded on mere presence shall not be recognised under the Regulation.​[29]​

Arguably, jurisdiction founded on mere presence undermines the legitimate expectations of defendants. A defendant may legitimately expect to be sued in the state where he is domiciled, resident, does business, voluntarily submits to the exercise of jurisdiction or where the cause of action arose. A defendant hardly expects to be served with a claim form to which he must defend or at least contest on the pain of a default judgment given against him while shopping duty free in transit at Heathrow. The prospect of another country enforcing such a judgment is even more frightening. Furthermore, such jurisdiction is open to abuse. In Richman, it appears from some of the defendant’s defences that he had been misled by the nature of the documents served on him whilst in England and that he had relied on an undertaking by the plaintiff not to institute or conduct proceedings against him in England.​[30]​ Such jurisdiction offends the cardinal principles of fairness and reasonableness on which legal systems are founded. Thus, it is unsurprising that, as regards European Union domiciled defendants, this basis of jurisdiction is proscribed under article 3(2) of the Brussels Regulation.​[31]​ 

There is a distinct advantage to plaintiffs suing in a forum of their choice, even if that is where a defendant was merely present. Considerations of cost, legal aid, limitations, extent of possible awards, and the applicable law may all influence their decision. Motivated by legitimate self-interest, plaintiffs seldom make these determinations with regard to the interests of defendants. This brings to the fore the issue of whether in enforcing judgments founded on mere presence, the South African courts are affording enough protection to South Africans or people with assets in South Africa, who are sued abroad. The issue of whom to protect or which interests to serve often presents itself when reform of or change in private international law is at stake. For example, in Canada, the adoption of the real and substantial connection test for the enforcement of foreign judgments has been criticised as not affording enough protection to Canadians sued abroad. The much criticised American conflicts revolution, if it accomplished little else, served to expose the multiple interests at stake in the application of conflict rules. While it is possible for parties sued abroad on the basis of mere presence to defend the suit abroad or apply for the proceedings to be stayed, the cost imposed on defendants may not be wholly recoverable in court. Additionally, stay of proceedings is not as of right. 

It is paradoxical that the Supreme Court of Appeal enforced a judgment founded on a basis of jurisdiction which would have been insufficient under domestic South African law.​[32]​ The pervasive doctrine of effectiveness prevents the South African courts from assuming jurisdiction merely on the basis of the foreign defendant’s presence within the jurisdiction. There must be an attachment of the defendant’s assets to found or confirm jurisdiction.​[33]​ Indeed, so persistent is this requirement of effectiveness in South African law that it has been argued and held that, as between two foreign parties, submission alone is not enough to confer jurisdiction on the South African courts.​[34]​ Granted, there is a distinction between national and international competence and the bases of both competences need not, and indeed often does not, coincide. It follows that the fact that a state will assume jurisdiction on a particular ground does not mean it will enforce a foreign judgment founded on the exercise of jurisdiction on the same basis. Nonetheless, in principle rules on international competence   ought to mirror national jurisdictional rules; after all, why would a court enforce a judgment it does not have jurisdiction to give assuming it was sitting as the foreign court but applying its national jurisdiction rules?​[35]​ 

From a human rights and constitutional law perspective, it may be argued that the enforcement of a default judgment founded on mere presence violates the South African Constitution, and more particularly the constitutional guarantee of right to fair hearing which is binding on the judiciary, among others.​[36]​ Indeed, under the Constitution the courts are enjoined to develop or limit the common law in order to give effect to the Bill of Rights.​[37]​ It is unfortunate that the human rights dimension of this rule was not argued or considered by the court. This is not to suggest that the English court was bound to respect the South African constitutional guarantees.​[38]​ However, where a national court enforces a decision founded on a breach of principles reflected in its constitution, it shows little respect for its constitutional values.​[39]​ It must be recalled that in Richman, the defendant did not challenge the jurisdiction of the English court nor did he apply for the proceedings to be set aside or stayed at any stage, although he had that right. The issue here is whether the ‘sin’ of the defendant in not taking advantage of the right to contest the foreign proceeding, and potentially getting a fair hearing, should be visited on him in the domestic forum. Resolving this issue should involve an assessment of all the relevant facts including the potential cost of defending or challenging the foreign action, whether it was likely the foreign court would have declined jurisdiction, and the basis on which the foreign court assumed jurisdiction.

The Richman decision may also have an adverse economic impact. Private international lawyers have generally shied away from statistically measuring the impact of their discipline on business or individual decisionmaking. However, emerging scholarship indicates private international law considerations influence the international allocation of resources.​[40]​ It is possible to envisage a situation where people, aware of the decision and its implications for their assets in South Africa, will relocate these assets to jurisdictions that demand stricter standards before allowing the assets to be used to satisfy a foreign judgment debt.​[41]​

2. Richman and the Future of International Competence
In the light of the explanation for the decision, namely the need to facilitate international trade and commerce, it is debateable whether the Richman decision has set the stage for the recognition of other liberal grounds of international competence in South Africa. In Supercat Incorporated v. Two Oceans Marine​[42]​ the plaintiff sought enforcement of a Florida judgment against the defendant South African company. The Florida court assumed jurisdiction on the basis that the tort involved fraud, and had been committed within its jurisdiction. At the time of the action the defendant was neither resident nor domiciled in Florida. However, appearance had been entered and the jurisdiction of the court denied. Thereafter, it failed to proceed with its defence. It was held that the Florida court was not internationally competent under South African law. Counsel for the plaintiff referred to Canadian cases relating to the real and substantial connection test. Counsel argued that the traditional approach to the recognition of foreign judgments has been rendered obsolete by the exigencies of international trade, and called for a new approach.​[43]​ The judge found the Canadian cases “informative” but felt “not inclined or, sitting as a single judge, entitled to ignore the considerable weight of judicial authority in this country.”​[44]​ 

This will not be the last time the real and substantial connection test will rear its head in South Africa. In Richman, the court queried why “a party armed with a final and conclusive judgment of an English court should not be entitled, prima facie at least, if only on grounds of comity between civilised nations and having regard to the current global environment, to relief in our courts.” If this query points to the future direction of the law, then a more liberal foreign judgment enforcement regime is to be expected.

Technological advancement, the growth of international commercial relationships, the increased mobility of people across jurisdictions, and the demands of globalisation have led to calls for reconsideration of the law on the enforcement of foreign judgments.​[45]​ In Canada, these developments influenced the Supreme Court’s adoption of the real and substantial connection test as an additional basis of international competence,​[46]​ and the recent decision to enforce foreign non-money judgments.​[47]​ The same considerations influenced the Supreme Court of Appeal in Richman. As was stated:
“there are compelling reasons why…in this modern age, traditional grounds of international competence should be extended, within reason, to cater for itinerant international businessmen. In addition it is now well established that the exigencies of international trade and commerce require that final foreign judgments be recognised as far as is reasonably possible in our courts and effect be given thereto.”​[48]​

The underlying internationalist outlook that informed Richman is not free from criticism. In Canada, Professor Wai has warned against prioritising the international system on the strength of arguments like the need to facilitate international trade and commerce since this may mean that interests and values of individual parties to the litigation are lost or dealt with unfairly.​[49]​ Similar concerns relating to the inadequate protection of individual interests and expectations have been expressed about the private international law jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, with its emphasis on state interests and systemic stability.​[50]​ It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court of Appeal failed to identify or at least discuss the inherent dangers of its internationalist outlook especially in terms of not providing enough protection to residents of or people with assets in the jurisdiction sued abroad. 

D. CONCLUSION
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